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Abstract
Background:  The justification for Nazi programs involving involuntary euthanasia, forced
sterilisation, eugenics and human experimentation were strongly influenced by views about human
dignity. The historical development of these views should be examined today because discussions
of human worth and value are integral to medical ethics and bioethics. We should learn lessons
from how human dignity came to be so distorted to avoid repetition of similar distortions.
Discussion: Social Darwinism was foremost amongst the philosophies impacting views of human
dignity in the decades leading up to Nazi power in Germany. Charles Darwin's evolutionary theory
was quickly applied to human beings and social structure. The term 'survival of the fittest' was
coined and seen to be applicable to humans.
Belief in the inherent dignity of all humans was rejected by social Darwinists. Influential authors of
the day proclaimed that an individual's worth and value were to be determined functionally and
materialistically. The popularity of such views ideologically prepared German doctors and nurses
to accept Nazi social policies promoting survival of only the fittest humans.
A historical survey reveals five general presuppositions that strongly impacted medical ethics in the
Nazi era. These same five beliefs are being promoted in different ways in contemporary bioethical
discourse. Ethical controversies surrounding human embryos revolve around determinations of
their moral status. Economic pressures force individuals and societies to examine whether some
people's lives are no longer worth living. Human dignity is again being seen as a relative trait found
in certain humans, not something inherent. These views strongly impact what is taken to be
acceptable within medical ethics.
Summary: Five beliefs central to social Darwinism will be examined in light of their influence on
current discussions in medical ethics and bioethics.
Acceptance of these during the Nazi era proved destructive to many humans. Their widespread 
acceptance today would similarly lead to much human death and suffering. A different ethic in 
needed which views human dignity as inherent to all human individuals.
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Background
The 60th anniversary of the liberation of the Nazi concen-
tration camps has drawn attention once again to one of
humanity's darker hours. Medicine and nursing in the
Nazi era continue to draw attention and reflection, in part
because they demand that we as humans examine who we
are and why we believe we matter. The answers pro-
foundly impact our ethics, how we treat one another.
Part of the perplexing puzzle created by the Nazi atrocities
is how trained medical and nursing professionals in a
modern, civilized society could have allowed what hap-
pened. Doctors and nurses, dedicated to caring for other
human beings, looked on as those entrusted to their care
were mistreated and killed. Even worse, some of those
professionals participated in unethical and criminal activ-
ities. How could they have done this?
The search for an answer must delve into the underlying
beliefs commonly held at that time. This investigation is
crucial because if those beliefs prevail again we must won-
der whether such unconscionable behaviour will likely
follow in their path. The origins of the Nazi atrocities do
not lie in concentration camps set up by a totalitarian dic-
tatorship. They are rooted in beliefs promoted by particu-
lar social philosophies and practices that began in
hospitals.
Ethics often focuses on how we decide what is ethical in a
particular case or on a certain issue. Ethics must also
examine where the underlying beliefs that impact those
decisions come from. The Nazi programs of involuntary
euthanasia, forced sterilization, eugenics and human
experimentation were strongly influenced by views about
human dignity current at that time. These views had been
popularized in Germany and much of the Western world
since the latter decades of the nineteenth century. They
helped lead to the rejection of previously dominant ideas
like the inherent value and dignity of all human life.
Other beliefs were promoted and accepted, notions like
lives unworthy to live, races unfit to reproduce, and the
elimination of the unfit. Hitler was saying nothing that
had not been repeatedly stated in academic and popular
circles when he wrote in Mein Kampf:
"The state has the responsibility of declaring as unfit
for reproductive purposes anyone who is obviously ill
or genetically unsound ... and must carry through with
this responsibility ruthlessly without respect to under-
standing or lack of understanding on the part of any-
one" [1].
One of the more influential sources of these ideas was the
1920 book by Binding and Hoche, respected academics
from medicine and law. They asked, "Is there human life
which has so utterly forfeited its claim to worth that its
continuation has forever lost all value both for the bearer
of that life and for society?" [2]. Their answer, and that of
many scientists and medical academics, was an unequivo-
cal 'Yes.' The leading German human genetics text at the
time contained much racist language, depicted Jews nega-
tively, and advocated infanticide for disabled infants [3].
Yet it received overwhelmingly positive reviews in medical
and scientific journals in many other countries, and went
through five editions before 1940. One of its authors
claimed it contained the essentials of the Nazi worldview
and Hitler frequently used expressions directly from it.
Binding and Hoche were not alone when they pro-
claimed:
"There was a time, now considered barbaric, in which
eliminating those who were born unfit for life, or who
later became so, was taken for granted. Then came the
phase, continuing into the present, in which, finally,
preserving every existence, no matter how worthless,
stood as the highest moral value. A new age will arrive
– operating with a higher morality and with great sac-
rifice – which will actually give up the requirements of
an exaggerated humanism and overvaluation of mere
existence" [4].
The "phase" to which they referred was the Christian era.
Proponents of this "new age" frequently included attacks
on this Western ethic because of its care and compassion
for the weak and the sick. The idea that all human life had
inherent dignity was replaced with the view that some
human lives were not worth living and should be elimi-
nated.
Teasing out the many philosophical influences on Hitler
and Nazism is fraught with difficulties. However, a grow-
ing consensus holds that at the heart of these views was
the development of social policy based on the principles
of Darwinian evolution – what is known as social Darwin-
ism. The definition of social Darwinism varies considera-
bly, in part because social Darwinists have often held very
different views on a variety of other issues. However, a
useful definition is provided by Hawkins who concludes
that social Darwinism is best seen as a world view consist-
ing of five interlinked assumptions [5]. He explains the
diversity of views on some ideological issues found
among social Darwinists as arising from indeterminacies
with the world view itself. These allow the world view to
be compatible with a wide range of positions on many
issues. The beliefs that Hawkins finds among social Dar-
winists are that:
(i) biological laws govern all of nature, including humans;BMC Medical Ethics 2006, 7:2 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6939/7/2
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(ii) population growth puts pressure on resources that
generates a struggle for existence;
(iii) physical and mental traits that confer competitive
advantages in this struggle can spread throughout the
population through inheritance;
(iv) selection and inheritance lead to new species appear-
ing and others going extinct;
(v) all of the above apply to human culture, and therefore
human thinking, religion, psychology, politics and ethics
have evolved through natural selection.
Hawkins holds that the first four beliefs can be held with-
out someone being a social Darwinist, but addition of the
fifth belief is crucial to any definition of social Darwinism.
These beliefs will be explained further as we examine the
major influences on the development of social Darwin-
ism.
While acknowledging the limitations of any definition,
this paper's focus will be more on the impact of social
Darwinism in Germany, especially its impact on views of
human dignity. What made Germany unique was that
these beliefs were imposed by a totalitarian regime [6]. At
the same time it must be acknowledged that many other
beliefs influenced the ideology and ethical positions ulti-
mately promoted by Hitler and the Nazis.
The influences of social Darwinism on medical ethics
must be examined carefully because Western society is
currently enamoured by many of these same beliefs. They
are not labelled as such, and are often promoted inde-
pendently. But the ideas themselves are there and already
impacting current thinking within medical ethics and
bioethics.
Any attempt to draw connections between the Nazi Holo-
caust and contemporary bioethical debate must be done
carefully. Too often connections are made that are tenu-
ous at best, and completely wrong at worst [7]. Some
claim it is impossible to draw any meaningful lessons
from what was basically an "irrational lust for murder"
[8]. Any mention of the Holocaust can raise so many emo-
tions that rational discussion becomes difficult [9]. Some
are offended that anything today could be compared to
the Holocaust since it is viewed as the icon of absolute
evil. Yet similarities do exist between some of the practices
carried out by the Nazis and practices currently being
debated. Some emphasise these similarities while others
focus on the differences to avoid any connection. The
claim is often made that "then is not now, and there is not
here, and they are not us" [10]. The assumption is that we
could never do what they did.
Yet they were people like us. Part of the internal anguish
in examining the Holocaust comes from wondering
whether we actually could do what they did. Some claim
the Nazis were completely psychopathic. Others disagree,
like Elie Wiesel who wrote that, "They did not think that
what they were doing was wrong. They were convinced
that what they did was good" [11]. They thought they
were doing what was best for humanity, or at least for
their Volk. Then and now, the same questions were asked.
"Who shall live and who shall die? And, Who belongs to
the community entitled to our protection? Then and now,
the subject at hand is killing, and letting die, and helping
to die, and using the dead" [12]. Then and now, similar
arguments based on similar worldviews were used to jus-
tify controversial practices.
This paper will not try to assess the ethics of practices like
euthanasia by making analogies between the present and
the Nazi era. Rather, we will examine some of the beliefs
that lay at the roots of Nazi ideology, and show parallels
in contemporary bioethical thought. Before we can be too
sure that we will not repeat the mistakes of Nazism, we
must examine the beliefs that led them to do what they
did to other humans. This will take us first to the origins
of social Darwinism and how it impacted people's views
on human dignity.
Discussion
Major influences
To understand how statements like those already quoted
could have been accepted by anyone in a caring profes-
sion, we must look at some of the major ideological
beliefs that influenced the development of social Darwin-
ism. Some of these influences impacted Charles Darwin
himself as he developed his theory of evolution by natural
selection. Others impacted those who took Darwin's the-
ory and applied it to social and ethical policies.
Social Darwinism is a naturalistic form of evolutionary
ethics. It sought to replace the previously dominant ethi-
cal systems of the late nineteenth century: those based on
transcendental ethical systems like Judeo-Christianity or
philosophical systems like Immanuel Kant's deontology.
The idea that nature and science could make a significant
contribution to ethical and social policy represented a
major shift in thinking.
Malthusianism
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries new
social policies were regularly proposed to combat prob-
lems like poverty. In spite of new wealth from industriali-
zation and colonization, poverty remained a major
problem leading to implementation of various social pro-
grams [13]. Thomas Robert Malthus (1766–1834) pro-
posed one such new and controversial approach based onBMC Medical Ethics 2006, 7:2 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6939/7/2
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biological observations that animal populations consist-
ently outgrew whatever nourishment was available. "The
cause to which I allude, is the constant tendency in all ani-
mal life to increase beyond the nourishment prepared for
it.... Necessity, that imperious all-pervading law of nature,
restrains them within the prescribed bounds" [14]. He
concluded that poor laws were doing more harm than
good and should be abandoned, leaving the poor to take
responsibility for their own condition.
Malthus thus raised the possibility that continued popula-
tion growth was neither natural nor necessarily good. He
concluded that while giving aid to the poor appeared to be
the humanitarian response, it was not the right response.
His biographer noted that the avalanche of criticism he
received made him the "best-abused man of the age" [15].
Charles Darwin later acknowledged that Malthus strongly
influenced his thinking. More generally, though, he laid
the foundation for a view of ethics based on observing
biological behaviour (science), rather than on philosophy
or theology.
Herbert Spencer
Herbert Spencer (1820–1903) is regarded as "the most
influential writer of this time on general philosophy and
man's place in nature. When he died he was the most
famous and most popular philosopher of his age and was
seen by many as a 'second Newton"' [16]. More popularly,
his most famous and enduring contribution may be for
coining the phrase 'survival of the fittest.' He derived this
phrase from philosophical reflection, not scientific obser-
vation, six years before Darwin published The Origin of
Species [17].
Spencer was a firm believer in the progressiveness of evo-
lution, and taught that 'survival of the fittest' should be
the rule for society. However, he became disillusioned
with social policies that he believed were taking society
away from this ideal. He commented in 1884 that in spite
of the "truth" of 'survival of the fittest' being "recognized
by most cultivated people ... now more than ever, in the
history of the world, are they doing all they can to further
the survival of the unfittest!" [18].
Spencer rejected the idea of caring for the poor and sick.
"The poverty of the incapable, the distresses that come
upon the imprudent, the starvation of the idle, and those
shoulderings aside of the weak by the strong ... are the
decrees of a large, far-seeing benevolence" [19]. Spencer
became an advocate for policies that would help only the
fittest to survive. Spencer's views differed radically from
ideas prevalent in the health care professions that the sick,
disabled, and the weak ought to be cared for because of
their weakness and vulnerability [20]. Such beliefs were
based on ideas like the inherent dignity of all humans, the
sanctity of human life and the notion that all humans
were entitled to certain rights. These views of human dig-
nity were violently rocked by the publication of Darwin's
scientific treatise.
Natural selection
Charles Darwin (1809–1882) proposed in The Origin of
Species that all biological variation could be explained on
the basis of natural selection [21]. Later scientific work
connected the source of natural variation with genetic
mutations that randomly appear in species' genes. Those
variations that improve individuals' survivability, and
their ability to leave offspring, will be found in larger pro-
portions of subsequent populations. Useful, random
changes are thus naturally selected because they help the
organism adapt better and survive longer. Thus, Darwin
boldly claimed to explain the origin of all species by nat-
ural mechanisms – not special creation. He himself
claimed that this was "the doctrine of Malthus applied
with manifold force to the whole animal and vegetable
kingdoms" [22].
The impact of Darwin's work has been monumental. One
authority claims that, "Next to the Bible no work has been
quite as influential, in virtually every aspect of human
thought, as The Origin of Species" [23]. The evolutionary
philosopher, George Gaylord Simpson, proposed one rea-
son for this, which applies most directly to our topic here.
"The Darwinian revolution changed the most crucial ele-
ment in man's world – his concept of himself" [24]. Simp-
son later claimed that all attempts prior to 1859 to answer
the question 'What is humanity?' are worthless and ought
to be ignored completely [25].
Darwin was initially reluctant to apply natural selection to
humans. His early publications avoided addressing the
issue, but left the door open for others to see the implica-
tions. In The Origin, he wrote:
"It may be difficult, but we ought to admire the savage
instinctive hatred of the queen-bee, which urges her
instantly to destroy the young queens her daughters as
soon as born, or to perish herself in the combat; for
undoubtedly this is for the good of the community;
and maternal love and maternal hatred, though the
latter fortunately is most rare, is all the same to the
inexorable principle of natural selection" [26].
By 1871 Darwin could no longer hide his views on human
evolution and he published The Descent of Man. However,
his notebooks from 1838 contain many ruminations on
the implications of his work for humans and in particular
for ethics and morality [27]. The Descent claimed that in
primitive tribes "the weak in body or mind are soon elim-
inated" in contrast to "civilised men" who "do our utmostBMC Medical Ethics 2006, 7:2 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6939/7/2
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to check the process of elimination; we build asylums for
the imbecile, the maimed, and the sick; we institute poor-
laws; and our medical men exert their utmost skill to save
the life of every one to the last moment" [28]. He saw this
as "highly injurious to the race of man." In spite of this, he
predicted that, "At some future period, not very distant as
measured by centuries, the civilised races of man will
almost certainly exterminate, and replace the savage races
throughout the world" [29]. His ideas were quickly
accepted, though Darwin noted that they were most rap-
idly welcomed and promoted in Germany. Before exam-
ining this, we must briefly explore another aspect of
evolutionary theory.
Heredity
While natural selection was accepted as the method by
which changes were selected, the mechanism by which
the changes initially occurred was unclear. DNA and
genetics were unheard of then. Although initially sceptical
of the Theory of Acquired Characteristics proposed by
Jean Baptiste de Lamarck (1744–1829), Darwin gradually
came to accept the idea [30]. This view held that organ-
isms adapted to the pressures of their environment and
would then pass on those acquired characteristics to their
off-spring. Giraffes can be used in a simplified example.
When feeding, giraffes stretch their necks to reach higher
and higher leaves. By continuously doing this, their necks
might get longer. According to Lamarck's theory, the
longer-necked giraffes would eat more, live longer, and
have more offspring. Gradually, then, giraffes would
evolve into animals with longer necks.
Lamarck's theory was applied beyond zoology. It gave
hope to social reformers that education and other social
policies could lead to improvements in humans that
would be passed on to future generations. However, the
theory received a significant blow when August Weis-
mann (1834–1914), a German biologist, published the
results of experiments with mice in 1888 [31]. Weismann
cut the tails off nine hundred mice over six generations –
yet all the offspring grew tails. Changes made in one gen-
eration were not being passed on to the next generation.
Social reformers who had accepted Lamarck's theory saw
implications for their policies. Now, it seemed, some peo-
ple were destined to be a certain way, and little or nothing
could be done about it. Weismann used the term 'germ' to
describe the earliest physical manifestation of an individ-
ual, much as we might use the term 'genome' to refer to
hereditary material. He claimed:
"We cannot by excessive feeding make a giant out of
the germ destined to form a dwarf; ... or the brain of a
destined fool into that of a Leibnitz or a Kant, by
means of much thinking. ... Hence natural selection,
in destroying the least fitted individuals, destroys
those which from the germ were feebly disposed" [32].
Natural selection and evolution appeared to support
claims that humans change in the same way as other ani-
mals. Even if social policies impacted one generation, the
evidence against Lamarck's theory implied that these
changes would not be inherited. Changing those who
were weak and unfit would not apparently provide a last-
ing solution. The logical, though controversial, next step
was to propose eliminating weakness and degeneracy by
preventing those with certain traits from passing them on
to later generations.
Eugenics
The discovery that variations occur randomly and are then
transmitted genetically raised the possibility that change
could be directed. Francis Galton (1822–1911) coined the
term eugenics to describe "the study of agencies under
social control that may improve or impair the racial qual-
ities of future generations either physically or mentally"
[33]. At this time in history, the Western world held to a
profound belief in progress, and evolution was seen as
something that could be used to further human progress.
A widely disseminated poster represented eugenics as a
tree, with the caption, "Eugenics is the self-direction of
human evolution."
Many at this time also accepted that all human traits were
genetically determined. Leading academics from scientific
and other fields held that "qualities such as intelligence,
mental illness, work ethic, criminality and poverty were
inherited" [34]. The way to improve society was thus to
encourage those with 'good genes' to reproduce and dis-
courage those with 'bad genes' from having children. In
the US, this led to laws restricting immigration and forc-
ing sterilization on certain people. Many European coun-
tries considered similar laws, and some implemented
them. In Germany, calls for eugenics soon got entangled
with ideas like racial hygiene, anti-Semitism, and Nazism.
Rather than just preventing the unfit from reproducing,
the policy became one of eliminating the unfit. No one
author better exemplifies the application of these princi-
ples than Ernst Haeckel (1834–1919).
Ernst Haeckel
Haeckel was a scientist who went on to become a prolific
popular author. He wrote the three most popular non-fic-
tion books in Germany at the turn of the century [35].
Haeckel's views on ethics and morality featured promi-
nently in all these books, working out the implications of
natural selection for human society. He congratulated
Darwin on his seventieth birthday for having "shown man
his true place in nature and thereby overthrowing the
anthropocentric fable" [36]. This fable referred to Chris-BMC Medical Ethics 2006, 7:2 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6939/7/2
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tian teaching that humans were specially created and were
therefore entitled to special protections, the so-called
sanctity of human life. Foremost in Haeckel's mind was
the belief that Darwinism made God, and in particular the
God of Judeo-Christianity, superfluous.
Haeckel's ethics and social policies started from the
premise that human worth was not inherent, but depend-
ant on fitness and potential contribution to society.
Human progress is based on "the struggle for existence
and natural selection" which Haeckel viewed as natural
laws. For him, then, "politics is applied biology." Hae-
ckel's social Darwinism led him to propose some radically
different claims about what was ethical regarding
humans. As early as 1870 he stated:
"If someone would dare to make the suggestion,
according to the example of the Spartans and Red-
skins, to kill immediately after birth the miserable and
infirm children, to whom can be prophesied with
assurance a sickly life, instead of preserving them to
their own harm and the detriment of the whole com-
munity, our whole so-called 'humane civilization'
would erupt in a cry of indignation" [37].
He went on to make clear that he advocated infanticide,
and also abortion, assisted suicide, and the involuntary
killing of the mentally ill. He later added to this group,
lepers, cancer patients and those with incurable diseases
whose lives were "totally worthless" and a burden on soci-
ety. Underlying all these proposals was his belief stated in
1864 that, "Personal individual existence appears to me
so horribly miserable, petty, and worthless, that I see it as
intended for nothing but for destruction" [38].
The path to Nazi medicine
Other factors contributed to the situation in Germany that
led to the acceptance of Nazi policies. Economic pressures
on the healthcare system were severe in the early twentieth
century. For example, between 1885 and 1900 the
number of people in the mental asylums of the state of
Prussia increased by 429 percent while the general Prus-
sian population increased by only 48 percent [39]. A
prominent science journal held a competition in 1911
(with a considerable cash prize) for the best essay on the
topic, "What do the bad racial elements cost the state and
society?" [40]. The winning essay examined the costs of
institutionalizing "inferior" people in Hamburg, and was
later used by an anatomy professor at the University of
Vienna to support his claim that, "As cruel as it may
sound, it must be said, that the continuous ever-increas-
ing support of these negative variants is incorrect from the
standpoint of human economy and eugenically false" [41].
Only when the economic pressures were combined with
social Darwinism's view of human dignity did the elimi-
nation of the weak and unfit become an acceptable
option.
Under such influences, medicine and nursing changed
dramatically in early twentieth-century Germany. In addi-
tion to economic pressures and eugenics, social Darwin-
ism's prioritization of race over individual impacted the
day-to-day activities of doctors and nurses. Warren Reich
has demonstrated how the notion of care itself was trans-
formed during this time. Popular reformers of the health-
care system advocated moving the traditional emphasis
on care as concern for sick or weak individuals to a view
of care as preservation of the health of those who had the
most to contribute to society. This was based on "the
meaninglessness of the individual in the larger biological
picture" [42]. This transformed medical and nursing atti-
tudes towards their practice and the meaning given to the
duty to care. Thus, "Nursing care was not to be given to the
weak. Nurses were cautioned against trying to show false
mercy to uselessly sick people; and, in fact, nurses were
taught that taking care of 'useless' people did harm to the
nurses themselves" [43]. All based on the ideology of
social Darwinism.
German medical academics combined such principles
with racist ideas. Alfred Ploetz co-founded the German
Society for Racial Hygiene in 1904. A sociologist with
whom he worked closely stated that the highest moral
principle is, "Everything that promotes the increased
reproduction of the more fit racial elements, even if [it is]
at the expense of the unfit" [44]. Ploetz attacked Christian
morality as too focused on love and sacrifice. Wilhelm
Schallmayer rejected Christianity because of its concern
for the weak and vulnerable which counteracted natural
selection. Instead, Schallmayer held that the first state to
adopt evolutionary ethics would prevail over all others in
the struggle for existence [45]. To the notion of the sur-
vival of the fittest individual within a society was now
added the notion of the struggle of one society against the
other – so that the fittest race would survive. Extermina-
tion and war then became moral goods to eliminate the
weak.
What remained was for someone to put social Darwinism
into practice. One historian notes that by the time Hitler
was living in Vienna in the 1920s, the press was "saturated
with racist social Darwinism" [46]. How exactly Hitler
picked up these ideas is uncertain, but his writings reveal
his acceptance of the social Darwinist view of human dig-
nity. He justified the strong asserting their will over the
weak by claiming "it's the law of nature" [47]. Hitler, like
Haeckel, turned to Sparta as an exemplary society that
implemented the type of social policy he favoured. Hitler
put it this way:BMC Medical Ethics 2006, 7:2 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6939/7/2
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"Sparta must be regarded as the first folkish state. The
exposure of the sick, weak, deformed children, in short
their destruction, was more decent and in truth a thou-
sand times more humane than the wretched insanity
of our day which preserves the most pathological sub-
ject" [48].
Five beliefs and their impact on bioethics
During the decades following the publication of The Ori-
gin of Species, a set of beliefs emerged that radically
changed how people viewed human dignity. This dramat-
ically altered what was held to be right and wrong in the
way humans treated other humans. It profoundly
impacted what doctors and nurses viewed as ethical. The
particular beliefs varied somewhat among social Darwin-
ists, but were united in being seen as implications of bio-
logical evolution for ethics. The following list brings
together themes threaded throughout the writings of
social Darwinists and presents them as five beliefs directly
impacting views of human dignity and ethics [49].
1. The nature of ethics is relativistic, not universal. Ethics
and morality emerged and evolved as humans and human
society developed and changed. Thus, ethics must change
as the environment changes. Traditional beliefs must
change, including those about human dignity.
2. The distinction between humans and other animals is
blurred because humans gradually evolved from other
species, as opposed to having been specially created and
thus endowed with unique dignity.
3. Human inequality exists in nature and leads to grada-
tions of fitness. Race and physical and mental abilities
become determinants of human dignity – as opposed to
all humans having inherent dignity.
4. At the lower end of the spectrum, some lives have so lit-
tle value (or quality) that they become 'lives not worth liv-
ing.'
5. Natural selection shows that survival of the fittest is a
law of nature. Therefore, policies that bring about the
death of those not fit for survival become ethical. At the
very least, it becomes ethical not to help those humans
deemed to be less fit.
These beliefs are important to recognize because similar
ideas are increasingly being advocated today by some
within bioethics and society more generally. While not
typically presented as a revival of social Darwinism, these
beliefs are offered piece-by-piece in certain approaches to
ethical dilemmas. Some examples will be given to support
this view.
As society becomes increasingly enamoured by these
views, all involved in healthcare should examine the
influence and validity of these beliefs carefully. Hitler
believed that his racist and eugenic practices were ethical
and could be defended based on social Darwinist presup-
positions. It seems unlikely that similar policies will be
forced upon Western society by totalitarian regimes. But
little by little, a society that accepts social Darwinist pre-
suppositions will come to accept eugenic practices and
policies. Widespread individual acceptance of such views
could just as likely lead to widespread discrimination and
maltreatment of those deemed unfit to survive.
1. The nature of ethics
The atrocities of Nazi Germany put evolutionary ethics
into bad repute for some decades. Recently, though, there
has been renewed interest in the idea [50]. Pulitzer-Prize-
winning author and Harvard biology professor, E. O. Wil-
son, has been called "Darwin's natural heir" and his book
Sociobiology: A New Synthesis, a Darwinian manifesto [51].
Wilson's sociobiology is based on the premise that all
human behaviour can be explained within an evolution-
ary framework. "Morality, or more strictly our belief in
morality, is merely an adaptation put in place to further
our reproductive ends. ... Ethics as we understand it is an
illusion fobbed off on us by our genes to get us to cooper-
ate. It is without external grounding" [52]. John Fletcher,
a bioethicist whose writings on gene therapy have been
very influential, claims that religion also is "an evolution-
ary program fulfilling a very important function: to make
you aware that you're part of the whole" [53].
Wilson claims ethics can be divided into two completely
different approaches. "Centuries of debate on the origin
of ethics come down to this: Either ethical principles, such
as justice and human rights, are independent of human
experience, or they are human inventions" [54]. If ethics
arises biologically, as naturalistic evolution holds, then it
is inherently changeable, as are views on human dignity.
With the denial of transcendent ethical principles, calcu-
lations of physical risks and benefits become the way to
make ethical decisions. James Watson shared the Nobel
Prize for his role in discovering the structure of DNA and
was the first director of the Human Genome Project. He
rejects the notion of individual rights claiming, "This
word right gets very dangerous. We have women's rights,
children's rights; it goes on forever" [55]. In the same dis-
cussion Watson rejects appeals to public consensus to
determine which genetic experiments should be permit-
ted on humans. "I'm afraid of asking people what they
think. Don't ask Congress to approve it. Just ask them for
money to help their constituents....Frankly, [the public]
would care much more about having their relatives not
sick than they do about ethics and principles."BMC Medical Ethics 2006, 7:2 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6939/7/2
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In the same paragraph, Watson praises the American sys-
tem for "not having cowboys doing things they
shouldn't." He dismisses ethical principles, yet also
appeals to one. "We should treat other people in a way
that maximises the common good of the human species."
For him, that includes manipulating the human genome
in experimental ways without any regulation, unless
"there's a terrible misuse and people are dying."
The ethics promoted by Watson arise out of his Darwinian
worldview where the guiding principle is the further evo-
lution of the human species. The focus is on genetic
change, since, as Watson stated before a US congressional
committee, "We used to think that our fate was in our
stars. Now we know, in large measure, our fate is in our
genes" [56]. Without individual rights, public consensus
or transcendent ethical principles, individuals will not be
protected against what might promote the good of the
majority. For Watson and bioethicists from the same
world view, human society needs to eliminate defective
genes, which justifies embryo selection, abortion, and
infanticide. Gene therapy, both somatic and germ-line, is
also accepted as a way to improve the human genome. At
the same time, ethics is reduced to one more tool that
facilitates evolutionary progress through the elimination
of the weak. "For a naturalistic approach, in the last anal-
ysis, ethics is a product of a long evolutionary process"
[57].
2. Human distinctiveness
Peter Singer is a bioethicist who, probably more than any
other author, has drawn out the ethical implications aris-
ing from claims that humans are not distinct from other
animals. He does so within a utilitarian perspective, but
also stresses the evolutionary nature of humanity. Singer
has recently promoted the idea that those on the political
left should turn to Darwinism in response to the collapse
of communism [58]. In his book, A Darwinian Left, he
develops his argument that Darwinism can be used to
support the social and political views typically held by the
Left [59].
Singer is better known for his controversial bioethical
positions and his promotion of animal rights. He uses the
term "speciesism" to criticise claims that humans have
any more rights than other species. "In other words, I am
urging that we extend to other species the basic principle
of equality that most of us recognize should be extended
to all members of our own species" [60]. Another author
has put it this way:
"Most human thinkers regard the chimp as a mal-
formed, irrelevant oddity while seeing themselves as
stepping-stones to the Almighty. To an evolutionist
this cannot be so. There exists no objective basis on
which to elevate one species above another. Chimp
and human, lizard and fungus, we have all evolved
over some three billion years by a process known as
natural selection" [61].
Viewing humans and animals as equals might somehow
raise the ethical standards by which all species are treated.
However, the early twentieth century social Darwinists
used this idea to treat some humans in ways that previ-
ously had been reserved for animals. Rather than elevating
the status of all species, they rejected belief in the inherent
dignity of all human life and justified the killing of inno-
cent humans believed to be of lower status than some ani-
mals. The same agenda is apparent in the title of Singer's
previously cited book, Unsanctifying Human Life. Rejection
of the idea that human life is somehow 'set apart' from
other species is found throughout Darwinian literature.
Just as earlier social Darwinists and Nazis advocated kill-
ing off weak and unfit humans, Singer similarly justifies
infanticide and euthanasia, and claims that some animals
have a higher moral standing than certain humans.
3. Human gradation
Having eliminated any special status for humans, Singer
and those who hold similar views, must use some criteria
to grade humans lives. This, we saw with the social Dar-
winists and Nazis, becomes arbitrary. Today, we see simi-
lar decisions being made about human lives, especially
where ethical dilemmas abound at the beginning and
ending of life. One of the infertility experts attempting to
clone a human baby responded to concerns about adverse
effects in resulting babies by replying, "We can grade
embryos. We can do genetic screening. We can do quality
control" [62].
Some claim that such quality control is different when
applied to human embryos. However, when accepted for
some members of the human species, it can quickly
spread. 'Quality control' for humans was accepted at the
beginning of the twentieth century, and it is already
expanding again at the beginning of the twenty-first cen-
tury. Professor John Harris is a member of the British
Medical Association's ethics committee and in 2004 he
declared:
"There is a very widespread and accepted practice of
infanticide in most countries....What do we really
think is different between newborns and late foetuses?
There is no obvious reason why one should think dif-
ferently, from an ethical point of view, about a foetus
when it's outside the womb rather than when it's
inside the womb" [63].
Harris used the same relativistic argument used by Hae-
ckel and Hitler: because other cultures practice infanti-BMC Medical Ethics 2006, 7:2 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6939/7/2
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cide, we ought to be open to the practice also. Daniel
Dennett comes to the same conclusion in his book about
how Darwinism puts "our most cherished visions of life
on a new foundation" [64]. He claims that Darwinism
makes it absolutely clear that there is no way to determine
when a human life begins or ends. Instead, he believes
"we all do share the intuition that there are gradations of
value in the ending of human lives." Since nature allows
many to die through miscarriages, he suggests that steps
be taken to ensure that a severely deformed infant "dies as
quickly and painlessly as possible." The implication is
that once we have graded human lives, some will not be
worth living.
4. Life not worth living
The notion of human lives not worth living was central to
the ideological changes at the beginning of the twentieth
century. Law-suits over wrongful life claims reflect a simi-
lar view. The idea is that some human lives are so debili-
tated or painful that it was wrong to allow them to come
into existence. A group of four internationally renowned
bioethicists defend genetic tests and therapies that would
lead to the prevention of certain births. They advocate a
distinction between "a worthwhile life" and "a life not
worth living" [65]. The latter "is a life that, from the per-
spective of the person whose life it is, is so burdensome
and/or without compensating benefits as to make death
preferable." They then argue that since persons can deter-
mine for themselves when their future lives are not worth
living, it is ethical to make such determinations pre-
natally and terminate embryos or foetuses whose future
lives would not be worth living.
The search for ways to grade human lives is often con-
ducted in terms of human personhood. In this approach,
those viewed as persons are granted rights and protec-
tions. Those humans viewed as non-persons need not be
given the same rights or protections and may therefore be
killed. Personhood, within a naturalistic evolutionary per-
spective, is typically determined on the basis of physical
characteristics. For example, Walter Glannon notes that,
"A person begins to exist when the fetal stage of the organ-
ism develops the structure and function of the brain nec-
essary to generate and support consciousness and mental
life" [66]. He goes on to argue that "testing and selective
termination of genetically defective embryos is the only
medically and morally defensible way to prevent the exist-
ence of people with severe disability, pain and suffering
that make their lives not worth living for them on the
whole" and that "we are morally required to prevent the
existence of people with lives that on balance are not
worth living."
Debate over personhood becomes ethically problematic
when combined with the notion of lives not worth living.
Historically, viewing some humans as 'non-persons' has
always been used "as a permissive notion that takes the
moral heat off certain quandaries raised by modern med-
icine" [67]. Hence, Singer declares that, "Killing a defec-
tive infant is not morally equivalent to killing a person.
Very often it is not wrong at all" [68]. Singer suggests that
newborns can be viewed as non-persons if they are not
wanted. "Thousands of years of lip-service to the Christian
ethic have not succeeded in suppressing entirely the ear-
lier ethical attitude that newborn infants, especially if
unwanted, are not yet full members of the moral commu-
nity" [69].
The similarities with the claims and proposals of early
social Darwinists should be apparent. Financial and other
pressures currently exist to declare some people as so
debilitated that they should no longer be considered per-
sons whose lives are worth living. Historians have traced
the acceptability of euthanasia in America and Europe to
acceptance of evolutionary thought. "The most pivotal
turning point in the early history of the euthanasia move-
ment was the coming of Darwinism to America" [70]. The
acceptability of killing as a legitimate response to certain
patients reveals similar attitudes today. In spite of being
illegal and against their code of ethics, hundreds of nurses
in Belgium have given lethal injections to patients, often
without their consent [71]. Doctors are practicing infanti-
cide in Belgium and other countries without waiting for it
to become legal [72]. While difficult ethical decisions
must be made with, and about, people at the end of life,
claiming their lives are not worth living has a dangerous
precedent.
5. Survival of the fittest
The often unspoken motivation underlying selection in
bioethics today is the notion of survival of the fittest.
Unlike the Nazi era, a totalitarian regime is not forcing its
view of fitness on society. Instead, fitness is being deter-
mined more individually. The idea is the same, however:
when people fall below the accepted standards for life,
their existence can be terminated. When the parents pur-
suing a cloned baby were asked about the risk of abnor-
malities in their potential child, they responded, "We
have discussed this with Dr. Zavos and, if there are abnor-
malities, we will abort" [73].
Prenatal genetic diagnosis can help people prepare for
problems with the pregnancy, delivery, or health of their
child. But in a culture where survival of the fittest is the
accepted paradigm, it also creates ethical dilemmas sur-
rounding who should survive after the diagnosis. Richard
Dawkins, a leading British populariser of Darwinism and
evolutionary ethics, claims the problem lies in the tradi-
tional ethic that we seek to hang on to. "The argument of
this book is that we, and all other animals, are machinesBMC Medical Ethics 2006, 7:2 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6939/7/2
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created by our genes. ... Much as we might wish to believe
otherwise, universal love and the welfare of the species as
a whole are concepts which simply do not make evolu-
tionary sense" [74]. Hence, he too advocates the killing of
certain members of our species.
Inherent human dignity
The concern here is not that proponents of social Darwin-
ism will usher in another Nazi-like regime. Similarities
between then and now are not suggested to claim that
Nazi practices are morally equivalent to what social Dar-
winists today endorse. There are important differences,
but there are also crucial similarities. We must recognize
where these beliefs led in the past, and understand why
this might have happened. Regardless of what Darwinian
and neo-Darwinian evolution may tell us about physical
development, the history of social Darwinism reveals that
its approach to ethics is destructive for humanity.
Health care systems around the world are facing huge eco-
nomic pressures, just as occurred at the beginning of the
twentieth century in Germany. These pressures can lead to
policies that remove rights from certain humans. Their
deaths may allow access to cells, tissues, or organs that
will help others. The resources needed to keep them alive
might be better spent elsewhere. Besides, it may become
difficult to see any value in their continued existence. Eco-
nomic scarcity becomes dangerous when coupled with a
view that the good of society trumps the rights of individ-
uals.
A ballast is required to counterbalance such pressures. The
inherent dignity of all humans, no matter how disabled or
at what stage of development, provides such a ballast. Any
sliding scale of human dignity inevitably leads to undig-
nified treatment of those humans who don't meet the
standard of the day.
Underlying social Darwinism, and its more recent formu-
lations, is a devaluing of human life. When humans are
viewed as simply part of the continuum of animal life,
and as having no inherent value, their worth is estimated
on a curve. Their rights become arbitrary based on their
estimated fitness and potential contribution. Combined
with the notion of survival of the fittest, this ethics turns
destructive. As was noted in 1949 when the Nazi doctors
were convicted in the Nuremburg trials:
"All destructiveness ultimately leads to self-destruc-
tion; the fate of the SS and of Nazi Germany is an elo-
quent example. ... The beginnings at first were merely
a subtle shift in emphasis in the basic attitude of the
physicians. It started with the acceptance of the atti-
tude, basic in the euthanasia movement, that there is
such a thing as life not worthy to be lived. This attitude
in its early stages concerned itself merely with the
severely and chronically sick" [75].
Such a shift is again occurring today within bioethics. A
search is under way for a secular ethic that will somehow
defend human dignity. But beliefs about human worth go
to the core of our worldviews and require that we admit
discussion of all approaches, whether materialistic, philo-
sophical or theological. Wilson, the sociobiologist, holds
that we must either base our ethics on rational, naturalis-
tic science or acknowledge that to some extent we need
help and guidance from a dimension beyond the purely
natural. He rejects the latter option because he refuses to
accept a spiritual side to humanity. Roger Trigg, in his sur-
vey of views of human nature puts the option this way:
"If I think that humans are indeed a little lower than
the angels, and may live on beyond this life, then I
shall view myself differently from the person who
accepts that the species Homo sapiens is one animal
species amongst many, characterized by a particular
evolutionary history. The tug between seeing humans
as packages of genes, existing without purpose, and as
the special creation of God is the modern version of a
perennial debate amongst philosophers" [76].
Summary
The concept of human dignity changed dramatically dur-
ing the first half of the twentieth century under the influ-
ence of social Darwinism. The inherent dignity and
special value of humans was rejected which permitted
widespread destruction of human life during the Nazi era.
Such an ethic was influenced by five tenets central to
social Darwinism: that morality is relativistic, that
humans do not have a unique status, that human dignity
is relative, that some lives are not worth living, and that
survival of the fittest is an ethical principle. Such beliefs
are becoming more prevalent in bioethical discourse and
have profound implications for current ethical and social
issues. Without a robust adherence to the notion that all
human life is dignified, and that human dignity is inher-
ent and endowed, destruction of human life will increas-
ingly be seen as the ethical answer to moral quandaries in
medicine, nursing and biotechnology.
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